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Do Elections Affect the Composition 





This paper investigates the impact of elections on the level and composition of fiscal 
instruments using a sample of 19 high-income OECD countries that can be characterized as 
developed, established democracies during the period 1972-1999. We find that elections shift 
public spending towards current and away from capital expenditures. Moreover, although we 
find no evidence for an electoral cycle for government deficit and expenditures, we do find a 
negative effect of elections on revenue. Our results indicate that the fall in revenue in election 
periods is attributed to a fall in direct taxation. The decomposition of our electoral dummy 
suggests that fiscal manipulation seems to be concentrated shortly before the elections. 
Finally, when we distinguish among predetermined and endogenous elections we find that the 
above results apply only for the predetermined electoral periods while endogenous elections 
seem to increase the budget deficit and to leave the composition of fiscal policy unaffected. 
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1. Introduction 
A growing literature suggests that elections create distortions to economic policy. An 
important part of this literature focuses on the incentives of office-motivated politicians 
to manipulate economic variables in order to get re-elected.
1 This theoretical argument, 
firstly formulated in the traditional opportunistic model of “political business cycles” of 
Nordhaus (1975), has been later addressed in a rational expectations framework both in 
adverse selection models [see e.g., Cukierman and Meltzer (1986), Rogoff and Sibert 
(1988), and Rogoff (1990)] as well as in moral hazard models [see, in particular, Persson 
and Tabellini (1990), Shi and Svensson (2006)]. A general feature of rational 
opportunistic “political budget cycles” (PBC) models is the presence of uncertainty 
regarding the policymakers’ competence.  In this environment the incumbent has an 
incentive to manipulate some fiscal instrument, if voters’ expectation regarding her 
competence depends on the value of this instrument.
2 Both types of rational PBC models 
predict a negative electoral impact on taxation
3. However, aggregate public spending may 
rise, as the incumbent will have an incentive to increase expenditures in the election 
period financed by a deficit observed by voters in the postelection period, but it may also 
fall, as a rise in the incumbent’s level of effort will limit ‘wasteful’ public spending’ 
[Besley and Case (1995)]. 
          The  main  empirical  implications  of  PBC  models  have  been  widely  tested.
4 A 
general conclusion of existing studies is that budget cycles exists in developing countries 
and in “new” democracies whereas established democracies with more competitive 
electoral system seem to experience a fiscal revenue cycle (see Brender and Drazen 
(2005), Persson and Tabellini (2003,chapter 8) and Shi and Svensson (2006)).  
Rogoff (1990) was the first to provide a firm theoretical foundation for the 
possibility of electorally timed shifts in the composition rather than the level of public 
spending. In the framework of an adverse selection type PBC model, he demonstrates 
                                                 
1 Another part of this literature consists of ‘partisan’ models, which deal with the behavior of ideologically motivated 
politicians. Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen (1997) provide a comprehensive review of all branches of political business 
cycle theory and Drazen (2000). 
2 Maley et al (2007) investigate the impact of electoral incentives on capital accumulation and 
macroeconomic fluctuations in a DSGE framework. 
3 For a discussion of the empirical implications of PBC models see Persson and Tabellini (1990) 
4 For a survey see Mink and de Haan (2005) and Vergne (2009).   3
that electoral incentives may induce the incumbent to signal her competence by shifting 
public spending towards more visible government consumption and away from public 
investment goods. Government consumption expenditures are more visible in the sense 
that they are observed before elections while capital expenditures (e.g. infrastructure) are 
mostly long-term projects that will increase voter’s utility upon completion. Assuming 
that the cost of fiscal distortion is higher for the more competent incumbent, a rise in 
current expenditures in the election period at the cost of lower public investment will 
signal the high competence of the incumbent if the cost of mimicking this policy is 
sufficiently high for the less competent policymaker. In a more recent paper Saporiti and 
Streb (2008) focus on the incumbent’s discretion over the budget and show that with a 
single fiscal authority the incumbent has an incentive to change the composition of public 
spending in favour of the more visible public good in order to appear competent to the 
voters and to increase the probability of being re-elected. However, separation of powers 
can work as a commitment device and may moderate or even eliminate the PBC under 
certain conditions regarding the institutional framework. 
Several studies attempt to assess empirically the electoral impact on the 
composition of public spending. Schuknecht (2000), using data on 24 developing 
countries from 1973 to 2002, finds that PBC are mainly attributed to increased rather than 
decreased capital expenditures (% GDP). Additionally, Block (2002), using data on 69 
developing countries from 1975 to 1990, checks if elections affect the share of capital 
expenditures (% expenditures). Indeed, his results reveal a deterioration of public 
investment during the election year. Along the same lines, a recent study of Vergne 
(2009), using data on 42 developing countries from 1975 to 2001, finds that elections 
shift the composition of spending towards current expenditures (% expenditures) and 
away from capital expenditures (% expenditures). 
Surprisingly, although the theoretical models of PBC were originally conceived 
for developed countries, the electoral impact on the composition of fiscal policy has so 
far been investigated for developing countries. Several arguments support this approach. 
Schuknecht (1996) suggests that fiscal manipulation in developing countries is more 
likely because check and balances are weaker. Moreover, the informational asymmetries   4
regarding competence that are a crucial assumption of PBC models may be more 
plausible in developing countries (see Block (2002)).  
On the other hand, it should be stressed that PBC models are all based on the 
assumption of competitive elections, which is more applicable to “old” democracies, 
rather than to developing countries many of which are “new” democracies. Indeed, multi-
party electoral competition that characterizes developed countries is critical in motivating 
incumbents to engage in pre-electoral economic policy distortions in order to retain their 
office. Similarly, the underlying voting behaviour of the PBC models is closer to the 
voting behaviour of more experienced voters in established democracies rather than to the 
inexperienced voting behaviour in “new” democracies. Moreover, it is not clear that the 
assumption of “lower visibility” of capital expenditures conforms to the experience of 
developing countries. Schuknecht (2000) argues that in developing countries public 
works projects can be easily started and stopped around elections whereas current 
expenditures may reflect longer-term commitments. Clearly, this argument is less 
applicable to developed economies. In fact Block (2002) shows that the hypothesis that 
elections give rise to a substitution of current for capital expenditures is best applied to 
the relatively richer countries in his sample of developing and middle-income countries. 
Our paper deals with an important question that has not been properly addressed 
by the relevant literature. Do elections in developed, established democracies affect the 
composition of fiscal policy? We try to answer this question by looking at the impact of 
the elections on different types of fiscal expenditure and revenue for a sample of 19 “old” 
democracies over the period 1972-1999. We classify public expenditures as capital and 
current expenditures while we decompose tax variables as direct (distortionary) taxation 
and indirect (non-distortionary) taxation (see Kneller et al. (1999)). At the same time, we 
provide some new evidence on the electoral cycle of aggregate fiscal variables. We 
measure electoral uncertainty by constructing two alternative electoral indicators: 
Following the relevant literature, we construct a dummy variable that receives the value 1 
in an election year and 0 otherwise and alternatively, we construct a weighted indicator 
that allows us to directly control for fluctuations in election dates by taking into account 
the specific time (month) that elections took place. Although, empirical analysis on the 
electoral impact on the composition of fiscal policy is usually based on the adverse   5
selection model of Rogoff (1990) we easily derive similar propositions regarding the 
composition of fiscal policy in the framework of the moral hazard model of Shi and 
Svensson (2006). This is an empirically more relevant theoretical framework since it 
predicts that all types of incumbent governments will change the composition of fiscal 
instruments independent of their competence level.  
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is novel in the following two aspects: 
Firstly, we examine the existence of pre-electoral fiscal policy distortions in the 
composition of public spending using a sample of developed countries that can be 
considered as established democracies during the entire sample period. Secondly, apart 
from looking at the composition of public spending we also look at the electoral impact 
on different tax policy instruments. The electoral impact on the composition of tax 
instruments has -according to our knowledge- not been empirically tested before for any 
sample of developed and/or developing countries.   
Our main results can be summarized as follows: Firstly, elections seem to shift 
public expenditures towards current and away from capital expenditures. We find that 
elections decrease capital and increase current expenditures as a percentage of total 
expenditures. Moreover, capital expenditures as percentage of GDP fall. Secondly, 
regarding aggregate fiscal variables, we find no evidence for an electoral cycle for 
government deficit and expenditures but we do find a negative effect of election on 
revenue. These results are consistent with existing stylized facts presented by Brender 
and Drazen (2005) and Shi and Svensson (2006). Thirdly, we find that the fall in revenue 
in election periods is attributed to a fall in direct taxation. The choice of policymakers to 
decrease direct rather than indirect taxation could be explained both in terms of ‘electoral 
efficiency’ as well as in terms of economic efficiency. One could argue that a fall in 
direct taxation produces a more ‘visible’ effect on voters’ income compare to a fall in 
indirect taxation.  Moreover, a large literature suggests that decreasing indirect taxation 
compared to direct taxation will have a positive growth effect through its impact on 
household’s savings and labour supply decisions.
5 In fact, governments have in recent 
years become increasingly interested in using indirect taxation to finance a larger share of 
public spending. Finally, if we distinguish among predetermined and endogenous 
                                                 
5 For a survey of relevant literature see OECD (2006).   6
elections – in line with the assumptions of our theoretical model - the above results apply 
only for predetermined electoral periods.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines our theoretical 
framework. Section 3 describes the empirical setup and presents the empirical results and 
discusses various sensitivity tests. Finally, section 4 offers some concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. The theoretical framework 
The theoretical argument that incumbents will have an incentive to manipulate the 
economy in order to get re-elected has been addressed in three main consequent 
frameworks.   
In the traditional opportunistic models of “political business  cycles” the 
incumbent boosts the economy before elections by exploiting a traditional Phillips curve 
leading to electoral cycles in inflation and unemployment [see Nordhaus (1975), 
Lindbeck (1976) and Tufte (1978)]. In a rational expectations framework, political 
budget cycles emerge due to the presence of information asymmetries between voters and 
politicians regarding the competence level of the latter [see e.g., Cukierman and Meltzer 
(1986), Rogoff and Sibert (1988), and Rogoff (1990)). In these rational opportunistic 
PBC models a competent incumbent has an incentive to signal her level of competence to 
voters through fiscal policy in order to increase the probability of being re-elected. In the 
separating equilibrium of the resulting signalling game, the competent incumbent will 
distort fiscal policy without being “punished” by rational voters who perceive this 
distortion as the cost of acquiring information regarding policymakers’ competence.  
A draw back of the adverse selection type models is the difficulty of testing their 
empirical implications since they predict budget cycles that will depend on the 
policymakers’ level of competence that is not directly observable. This difficulty is 
overcome by the moral hazard type models that are also, however, based on the presence 
of uncertainty regarding the policymakers’ competence [see, in particular, Persson and 
Tabellini (1990), Shi and Svensson (2006)]. In these models the policymaker, 
irrespectively of her level of competence, has an incentive to manipulate some fiscal 
instrument thereby affecting voters’ expectation regarding her competence. For example,   7
in this environment a policymaker will have an incentive to increase expenditures in the 
election period by increasing the deficit, which will be observed by voters in the 
postelection period. 
This section develops a simple theoretical model that borrows its main features 
from Shi and Svensson (2006). Shi and Svensson show the impact of elections on 
government deficit. In our model we neglect debt issuing and introduce public investment 
as the fiscal policy instrument with relatively lower visibility to voters.    
The economy consists of a large number of individuals each of whom derives utility from 
public goods and private consumption. As in Rogoff (1990) the government produces a 
“consumption” good (per capita) g and an “investment” good (per capita) k. The utility 
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where v’>0, v’’<0 and u’>0, u’’<0, c denotes the private consumption good and x takes 
the value – (½) if the incumbent is re-elected and (½) otherwise. As in Shi and Svensson 
(2006) we assume that voters differ in their preferences on issues other than consumption. 
This heterogeneity of voters is captured by δ that is uniformly distributed on [-1/2, 1/2] 
and reflects the voter’s preference on other issues so that if voter i prefers the incumbent 
(opponent) 
i δ <0(>0).  
 
Regarding the political environment, there are two parties competing for office, 
the one of the incumbent denoted by, in and the opposition party denoted by op. 
Politicians are office-motivated in the sense that when they derive utility Z from being in 
office. Thus, the utility function of political candidate j is given by, 
∑
=
− + + + =
T
t s
s s s s
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t Z k v g u c W ) ) ( ) ( ( β                                                                             (2) 
Every period each individual is endowed with income y and pays a lump-sum tax τ.  
Thus, the budget constraint of the government is given by, 
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j
t t t t k g ω τ + = + +1                                                                                                              (3) 
 
where  t ω  denotes the government’s level of competence that captures the administrative 
ability of the government. Given the level of tax revenue a government with a high level 
of competence is able to produce a higher level of public goods than a government with 
low competence. We assume that competence is random since the problems the 
policymaker faces may change over time. Moreover, we assume that competence is 
persistent in the sense that competence in the post-election period will depend on 
competence in the pre-election period.  Thus, in line with existing literature (see Rogoff 
(1990), Saporiti and Streb (2008)) we assume that competence follows a first-order 
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where  0 ) ( = ε E , 
2 ) ( σ ε = Var . F(ε) and f(ε) are the distribution function and the density 
function of ε respectively with  f(0)>0.  Note that the competence shock represents a 
source of uncertainty for the government since it is realised after the government policies 
are set.  
 
2.1. Equilibrium without political competition  
In the absence of political competition our problem can be broken down into a sequence 
of static maximization problems where the policymaker in office maximizes equation (2) 
with respect to  t g  and  1 + t k  subject to equations (3) and (4). The FOC are given by 
) 1 (
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2.2. Elections 
Let us now assume that elections take place every other period. In that case our 
assumptions regarding preferences and the stochastic environment allow us to break our 
problem into a sequence of two-period maximization problems. Our methodology is 
borrowed by Shi and Svensson (2006). The timing of the events is the following: At the   9
beginning of the pre-election period t, the policymaker decides on the level of the public 
consumption good, g and the level of the public investment good, k that will be consumed 
in the next period. In the absence of any fiscal rule, policies are set under discretion. 
After policies are decided the competence shock,  t ε  is realised and elections take place at 
the end of this period. We assume that voters are to some extend imperfectly informed in 
the sense that before they vote they observe only variables that represent consumption in 
the current period such as  ) ( t t g c  and t τ , while they only observe the public investment 
good,  1 + t k  in the next period.  
In the post-election period t+1 the timing of events is similar but no elections take 
place. In addition, the incumbent has no incentive to influence voters’ perception about 
his competence since competence in the next post-election period, t+3 is uncorrelated 
with competence in period t+1.  Thus, the optimal tax rate and the optimal public 
investment will satisfy the FOCs (5) and (6). 
In the election period t voters will vote for the candidate who will offer them the 
higher utility in period t+1. This will depend on their relative preference for the two 
parties reflected by δ and on the expected level of the policymaker’s competence. Voter’s 
i expected utility if the opposition party is re-elected is given by, 
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Similarly if the incumbent is re-elected expected utility in period t+1 is 
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where   10
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Note that g* and k* are the level of the public “consumption” good and public 
“investment” good that satisfy FOCs (5) and (6), while 
in
t k 1 + =
*
E k  is the optimal public 
investment set by the policymaker in the election period. Following the Shi and Svensson 
(2006) framework, subtracting (7) from (9) implies that voter i will vote for the 
incumbent if    0 ) ( ≥ −
i in
t t E δ ε  and given the distribution of δ,  
2
1
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We can re-write equation (3) as 
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Since voters can observe  t g  and  t τ  before the elections their estimate for the incumbent’s 
current competence shock, 
^
t ε  will depend on their estimate for public investment, 
^
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Thus, the probability that the incumbent will receive at least 50% of the votes is, 
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Our next step is to maximize the two-period utility function of the incumbent with respect 
to  1 + t k  taking into account equation (14), 
   11
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The FOC is 
X k k F k v t t t ) ( ' 1 ) ( ' 1
^
1 1 + + + − + =                                                                                           (16) 
In equilibrium  1
^
+ t k = 1 + t k =
*
E k  so we can write equation (16) as 
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Given that  ) 0 ( ' f >0 and v’’<0, we can conclude from comparing equation (6) with 
equation (17) that 
*
E k <
* k . This implies that electoral competition decreases capital 
spending in the election period. One can see from equation (3) that taxation will also 
fall
6.  
Concluding, the model’s main implication is that the electoral motives of the incumbent 
when fiscal policy is conducted under discretion will decrease the part of public spending 
that is ‘less visible’ in the election period allowing a fall in taxation, which is a ‘more 
visible’ fiscal policy instrument. As in Shi and Svensson (2006), in equilibrium this 
policy is fully expected and has no impact on the incumbent’s re-election probability.  
 
 
3. Econometric Analysis 
 
3.1. Data   
Our sample spans over the period 1972 to 1999 and includes 19 OECD countries
7 with 
competitive electoral systems. New Zealand is excluded from the sample due to data 
unavailability. Additionally, Greece, Portugal and Spain, have been dropped from our 
                                                 
6 Note that the fall in taxation at constant government consumption good, g, stems from the way we formulate 
preferences. We could as easily set up voters’ utility function so that taxation remains constant and g increases. 
7 The countries of our sample are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States.   12
sample since they cannot be considered as established democracies during the entire 
sample period. These “new” democracies are more prone to fiscal manipulation, since 
incumbents might be rewarded at the polls if they can “mislead” inexperienced voters by 
attributing the good economic conditions to their competency. Alternatively, we could 
have included these countries in our sample and exclude only those election observations 
which refer to the period that the democracy was in fact “new”. However, since as argued 
by Brender and Drazen (2005), there are doubts about how long the “new democracy” 
effect persists we opt for excluding the countries.  
Our fiscal data refer to the central government level, and are obtained from the 
"Global Development Network Growth Database".
8 Primary data for the proceeds are 
taken from IMF, "Government Financial Statistics" (GFS); and data for GDP come from 
Global Development Finance and World Development Indicators. In this study we want 
to check the existence of political cycles in aggregate fiscal data, and whether or not the 
composition of public spending and taxation is affected by elections.
 For the aggregate 
fiscal data, we use central government’s expenditures, revenues and budget 
surplus/deficit (expenditures, revenues and balance, respectively). As a second step, we 
use the economic classification provided by the GFS database and separate expenditures 
into public investment and public consumption. In particular, we disaggregate 
expenditures into capital expenditures (capital) and current expenditures (current). Both 
aggregated and disaggregated fiscal data are scaled to GDP and expressed as percentages. 
Finally, in order to test the electoral impact on the composition of total expenditures, we 
use the same measures expressed as percentages of total expenditures and denoted as 
capital_exp and current_exp, respectively. 
Regarding the tax variables we apply the approach of Kneller et al. (1999) and 
classify them as direct (distortionary) taxation and indirect (non-distortionary) taxation. 
Direct taxation includes taxation on income and profits, social security contributions, 
taxation on payroll and manpower and taxation on property, while indirect taxation 
includes taxation on domestic goods and services. Again, both direct and indirect taxation 
                                                 
8 An alternative database is OECD Economic Outlook, which, however, provides data from general government 
accounts. We instead opt for using central government data which are more consistent across countries and time 
periods. At the same, results for general government accounts that include all levels of government (state, local, 
central) would be difficult to interpret.   13
is expressed as percentage of GDP and total revenues, denoted as direct, indirect and 
direct_rev , indirect_rev, respectively.   
  Apart from the fiscal variables, in our estimated model we include s number of 
socio-economic variables, proposed by a previous study of Shi and Svensson (2006). In 
particular, we use the log of real per capita GDP (lgdppc) and real GDP growth rates 
(growth), since these variables should capture the possibility that the timing of elections 
depends on the state of the economy. All macroeconomic data for control variables are 
obtained from World Bank's "World Development Indicators" (WDI).  A complete list of 
all variables used in our estimations is provided in the Data Appendix. 
  We measure electoral uncertainty by constructing two alternative electoral 
indicators. First of all, following the majority of the empirical literature, we construct an 
election dummy (elec) that receives value 1 in an election year and 0 otherwise. It is 
important to note that this indicator is not affected by the specific time (month) that the 
election took place.We use this measure so that our results can be more easily 
comparable to the PBC literature. However, many researchers have noticed that if 
elections take place early in the year, then the dummy variable may be capturing 
primarily post-electoral effects. One way to deal with this problem with annual data is to 
construct a pre-election indicator (elec_2) that takes the value of one at the year 
preceding election and zero otherwise [see e.g., Franzese (2000), Angelopoulos and 
Economides (2008)]. More precisely: in election year t, elect_2 = x/12 with x denoting 
the month election is held, and [elect-1_2 = (12-x)/12] is allocated to the year before the 
election (if pre-election years overlap, elec_2 can exceed 1). Hence, this indicator allows 
us to directly control for fluctuations in election dates across as well as within countries. 
It is worth noting that we only include legislative elections for countries with 
parliamentary political systems and presidential elections for countries with presidential 
systems. Elections dates are taken from "Comparative Political Data Set I" [Armigneon 
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3.2 Empirical Specification  
Following the relevant literature we apply the Fixed Effects model specification [see 
among others Brender and Drazen (2005), Persson and Tabellini (2003) and Schuknecht 
(2000)]. Hence, our empirical model is of the following form:  
 
it i i it it elec a Y a Y ε λ μ β + + + Ζ + + = − 1 1 0                                                              (18) 
 
where Yit is a fiscal indicator in country i in year t, elec is  the indicator we use to capture 
the influence of elections and Z is the vector of country-specific and time-varying socio-
economic variables we hold constant. In addition, μi and λi are country and time-specific 
fixed effects and εit is the error term. Time fixed effects, as can be seen by the F-test 
results presented in the Tables, are in general significant and therefore there are included 
in regressions.
9  
Given that fiscal instruments display a great deal of persistence, we include the 
lagged dependent variable Yit-1 on the right hand side of the estimated equation. The 
lagged dependent variable is utilized as a means of capturing the dynamics of politics. 
There are theories in which an attitude at time t is a function of that same attitude at t-1 as 
modified by new information. Apart from the theory, the inclusion of a lagged dependent 
variable often eliminates serial correlation of errors. However, including a lagged 
dependent variable, introduces a potential bias by not satisfying the strict exogeneity 
assumption of the error term εit. Still, as it is analyzed in the literature, the estimated bias 
of this formulation is of order 1/T, where T is the length panel, even as the number of 
countries becomes large [see among others Nickell (1981), Kiviet (1995), Wooldridge 
(2002)]. The average time series length of our panel depends on the fiscal indicator we 
use, but in general is above 24 years and the bias is probably negligible. In addition, as 
suggested by Roodman (2006), when employing a system/difference GMM estimator the 
number of instruments should be less than or equal to the number of cross sections. An 
excessive number of instruments can result in an over fitting of the instrumented 
variables, thereby biasing the results towards those of the OLS estimator. 
                                                 
9 The qualitative results in all regressions do not significantly change when we exclude year effects.    15
Moreover, our model is tested by performing a modified Wald statistic for 
groupwise heteroskedasticity, as proposed by Green (2000), of the null hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity versus the alternative hypothesis of heteroskedasticity across groups. 
The null hypothesis cannot be accepted, indicating the presence of groupwise 
heteroskedasticity. Therefore, in our estimation procedure we use Huber-White standard 




In this section we first present evidence from estimating equation (18) for various fiscal 
variables using elec as the pre-electoral indicator. We then address the potential 
endogeneity of electoral procedures by separating out those elections whose timing is 
predetermined. Finally, we look how our results are affected by using elec_2  as an 
alternative pre-electoral indicator. 
 
3.3.1. Basic Results 
Table 1 shows the results when we include in our regressions binary indicator elec. 
Regarding the socio-economic variables, the coefficient of lgdppc is insignificant for all 
regressions, while growth is negative when statistically significant except for the case of 
fiscal variable indirect_rev. In the next section we will include in our regressions 
alternative socio-economic variables, as proposed by Persson and Tabellini (2003), in 
order to show that our results are not driven by the inclusion of specific control variables.  
To continue with, as far as aggregate fiscal data are concerned, we find no 
evidence for an electoral cycle for government deficit and expenditures as shown by the 
statistical insignificance of elec in columns (1) and (2). These findings are corroborated 
by the stylized facts presented in the studies of Brender and Drazen (2005) and Shi and 
Svensson (2006), in which fiscal cycles are driven by the experience of “new” 
democracies and less developed countries. Second, in accordance with the results of 
Brender and Drazen (2005), Persson and Tabellini (2003, chapter 8), we find a significant 
government revenues cycle, which reveals that in developed/established democracies 
government revenues fall during an election year.   16
    By looking at decomposed fiscal data we see that elections seem to have a 
negative and statistically significant effect on capital in column (4) and a statistically 
insignificant effect on current in column (5). Turning now to the effect of tax variables, 
direct seems to decrease before election, while indirect does not seem to be affected by 
the election period. These results indicate that direct taxation seems to be the driving 
force of the government revenues cycle.  
Next, at columns (8) to (11) of Table 1 we test if elections affect the composition 
of total expenditures and revenues. The results are consistent with our previous findings 
of a fall in government investment before elections. One can see in column (8) that 
elections decrease capital expenditures as a percentage of total expenditures. This implies 
that current expenditures, as a ratio of total spending should rise. Indeed the coefficient of 
elec in column (9) is positive and statistically significant revealing that current_exp is 
expanded in election year. This result is similar to those obtained by Block (2002) and 
Vergne (2009), but for a sample of new democracies and developing countries rather than 
a sample of established/developed democracies as in our case. At the same time, it is 
worth noticing, that the magnitude of fiscal manipulation seems much pronounced in 
these former studies. In addition, regarding pre-electoral tax composition only variable 
direct_rev seems to decrease in the election year. 
 
Table 1 here 
 
These results are consistent with Rogoff’s (1990) notion that ego rents from 
staying in office and information asymmetry induce incumbents to manipulate fiscal 
policy towards more visible public goods. What we see when fiscal elements are scaled 
to GDP is that government tries to “signal” its competence by decreasing visible 
government revenues, and more particularly direct taxation, in order to provide 
immediate economic benefit to voters. On the other hand, capital expenditures, which 
may only be observed by voters with a lag, seem to decrease in election year. As far as 
the composition of expenditures is concerned, we observe that public spending shifts 
towards more visible current expenditures and away from capital expenditures. The fact 
that we do not observe a PBC confirms the view that these cycles are driven by the   17
experience of “new” democracies and less developed countries where information 
asymmetries are more pronounced. In the case of developed countries, incumbents are 
more cautious when manipulating fiscal policy, because hi-tech media and advanced 
accounting practices allow well-informed voters to evaluate more precisely a 
government’s performance (competence). Furthermore, some studies support the view 
that voters seem to be fiscal conservatives and punish rather than reward loose fiscal 
policies during election year [see among others Peltzman (1992) and Brender and Drazen 
(2008)]. This is probably the reason why incumbents on the one hand decrease taxation, 
while on the other hand balance the fiscal budget by decreasing public investment.  
 
3.3.2. Predetermined election dates   
Another interesting issue concerning this literature is that election dates may not be 
exogenous. As argued by Rogoff (1990), when elections are held at the end of the term, 
distortions on the shape of fiscal policy can be more severe. The main reason is that 
incompetent incumbents may prefer to wait until the end of the term in order to receive 
additional ego rents from staying in office. At the same time, when election date is 
known in advance, opportunistic incumbent has ample to use fiscal policy in order to 
increase re-election probabilities, far greater, compared to the case of elections being 
called earlier. On the other hand, according to Berument and Heckelman (1998), 
incumbents probably are tempted to call early election, when economic conditions are 
particularly favorable, as an attempt to affect voting behavior, while incumbents without 
this option can only rely on fiscal manipulation. One way to address this issue, based on 
Brender and Drazen (2005) approach, is to separate out those elections whose timing is 
predetermined. We define as predetermined those elections, which are held either at the 
fixed interval or during the expected year of the constitutionally fixed term. Hence, we 
separate binary indicator elec into variables elec_pred and elec_end, for predetermined 
and endogenous election dates, respectively. In our case, among the 125 elections in the 
sample, 64 elections are classified as predetermined. 
As can be seen at Table 2, the basic findings for variable elec can be attributed to 
elections being held at the predetermined date. More specifically, we find that the 
coefficient of the electoral variable elec_pred reveals a government revenues cycle in   18
election year, similar to what was found by Brender and Drazen (2005) for a sample of 
established democracies. Also, as before, government revenues cycle is driven by a fall in 
direct taxation. At the same time, public investment seems to deteriorate during pre-
electoral period, which may be lying behind the finding of a neutral fiscal balance cycle. 
In addition, we find a shift towards more visible current expenditures share and away 
from capital expenditures. Regarding endogenously chosen electoral procedures, the 
coefficient on elec_end reveals a fiscal balance cycle at the 10 % level of significance. 
Hence, although the magnitude of pre-electoral distortions seems subtle for endogenously 
chosen elections, we have indications showing manipulation of the fiscal balance.  
 
Table 2 here 
 
3.3.3. Weighted electoral indicators 
Moving one step forward, in Table 3, we use the alternative electoral indicators elect_2 
and elect-1_2 that take into account the exact timing of elections. Thus, we proceed into a 
four-way split. More precisely, we split indicator elec_2 into elect_pred_2 (elect_end_2) 
and  elect-1_pred_2 ( elect-1_end_2), for predetermined (endogenous) election and pre-
election years, respectively. Regarding the case of predetermined elections one can draw 
two main conclusions from Table 3. Firstly, all electoral effects are captured by 
elect_pred_2,  while in all cases the coefficients of variable elect-1_pred_2  all are 
insignificantly related with fiscal variables. This finding indicates that electoral 
manipulation of fiscal policy occurs close to the election date. Secondly, the impact of 
elect_pred_2 on fiscal variables supports our previous results of a pre-electoral decrease 
in total revenue attributed to a fall in direct taxation as well as a fall in capital 
expenditures reflected to a shift of the composition of public spending towards more   
visible current expenditures and away from capital expenditures.  
Our basic findings in Table 1 and Table 2, which are consistent with the rest of 
the literature, support the view that dummy variable elec, which does not take into 
account the exact timing of elections, captures the influence of elections on fiscal policy 
equally well with the more precise electoral indicator elec_2.   19
For endogenous elections dates, results reveal a rise in revenue in the “early” pre-
election period captured by elect-1_end_2 triggered by a rise in direct revenues as a 
percentage of GDP. This revenue cycle is then followed with a significant fiscal balance 
cycle that is driven by an increase in current expenditures immediately before elections as 
shown by the coefficient of elect_end_2.  One possible explanation is that incumbents 
may call for elections prematurely when fiscal condition is favorable because the rise in 
revenue and budget surplus provides them a “leeway” for pre-electoral spending.  
 
Table 3 here 
 
These findings suggest a different behavior on behalf of the incumbent, which 
depends on the timing of elections. In particular, for predetermined elections an 
incumbent has the opportunity to shape fiscal policy far greater, than if early elections are 
held. Hence, opportunistic incumbents provide immediate benefits to voters by 
decreasing direct taxation, while public investment seems to deteriorate so that fiscal 
balance remains unaffected. On the other hand, early and unexpected elections and short 
campaign periods may induce incumbent to react abruptly and engage in expansionary 
fiscal policy even though it may has counter effects if it is perceived by voters as 
electoral manipulation. 
To sum up, our results for competitive elections in high-income OECD countries 
and “old” democracies reveal that incumbents manipulate fiscal policy in order to stay in 
office. One reason behind this result is that multi-party elections and uncertainty for the 
outcome induce incumbents to manipulate fiscal policy instruments. On the other hand, 
voters at developed counties are well informed regarding the level of distortions an 
incumbent tries to induce in fiscal policy during election year, as well as about its level of 
competence. Our findings tend to reveal that incumbents seem to cautiously manipulate 
fiscal policy instruments. This inference is supported by the magnitude of fiscal policy 
manipulation in our sample, which seems much smaller in comparison with similar 
studies for “new” democracies and developing countries according to Block (2002) and 
Vergne (2009).  
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3.4 Sensitivity analysis 
In this section we examine the robustness of the above results by re-estimating the 
regressions under various modifications. Firstly, we re-estimate our baseline specification 
using alternative control variables as proposed by Persson and Tabellini (2003). 
Secondly, we use an alternative way of specifying a dynamic model via the error term 
rather than using a lagged dependent variable. Thirdly, we apply the method developed 
by  Hadi  (1992)  in  order  to  identify  and  drop  outlier  observations  from  our 
regressions. Finally, in section 3.4.4. we conduct some additional empirical checks to 




3.4.1. Alternative control variables 
Until now we have applied in our baseline regressions time varying socio-economic 
variables as proposed by Shi and Svensson (2006). In order to test if our results are 
driven by this specification, we introduce in our estimated equation some alternative 
control variables as proposed by Persson and Tabellini (2003). In particular, we use the 
log of real per capita GDP (lgdppc), since, according to Wagner’s law, we expect that 
richer countries should have bigger public sectors. Moreover, we use output gap (gdphp) 
to control for fluctuations in fiscal policy induced by the business cycle and defined as 
the log difference between real GDP and its country specific trend computed using 
Hodrick-Prescott filter. Furthermore, we use two demographic variables representing the 
percentage of population aged 15-64 (pop1564), and above 65 years of age (pop65+), as 
demographic evolution may put pressure on the public budget. Finally, we use the degree 
of a country’s openness to trade (trade), since according to Rodrick’s (1998) proposition 
more open economies are expected to have bigger public sectors as a safety net against 
the exposure to the terms of trade risk. All macroeconomic data for control variables are 
expressed as percentages and obtained from World Bank's "World  Development 
Indicators" (WDI).  
                                                 
10 Results available upon request.   21
Regarding the socio-economic variables, we observe that the coefficient of lgdppc 
is insignificant, while gdphp  is  positive when statistically significant. The two 
demographic variables, pop1564 and pop65+, except for the case of fiscal variable 
indirect_rev, are positive when statistically significant. Moreover, trade doesn’t seem to 
verify Rodrick’s (1998) proposition, because results reveal, in most of the cases, a 
negative relation between fiscal variables and country openness to trade. Hence, results 
generally do not seem to confirm theoretical predictions. 
 
Table 4A and 5A here 
 
As for the electoral effects, apart from some negligible changes in significance 
levels, as can be seen in Tables 4A and 5A qualitative results remain essentially the same 
to those depicted in Tables 1-3. More specifically, we obtain a significant government 
revenues cycle, a fall in public investment and a shift in spending composition towards 
more visible public goods.  
 
3.4.2. Regression in First Differences 
Although our results reveal coefficients less than one for the lagged dependent variable, 
we want to assure that the time path is stationary. To the best of our knowledge, Maddala 
and Wu (1999) unit root test is the only test available for a time series cross-section data 
set with an unbalanced panel. However, a shortcoming of this test is that it is constructed 
from averaging the p-values for any test from each cross-sectional unit. Conventional 
panel unit root tests are sensitive to the existence of a few stationary series that may lead 
to the false rejection of the joint unit root hypothesis (see Taylor and Sarno (1998)).  For 
this reason, we check if our estimates are affected by unit root by applying the method of 
Levitt (1997). In particular, we are first differencing our dependent variable and all 
covariates of our model with the exception of election indicator variables. This implies 
that we put more structure on the data for the identification of the election effect. 
Additionally, the first difference of lagged dependent variable was generally insignificant 
and was dropped from the estimated equation. Also, taki ng firs t diff ere nces due to 
stationarity reasons eliminates time‐invariant fixed effects. But there could also be   22
time fixed effects in each country, so that first differencing just eliminates the time‐
invariant country effects, but not the time fixed effects. Αs can be seen in Table 4B, 
time fixed effects are in general significant and are included in regressions. Thus, the 
estimated equation has the following form: 
 
it i it elec a ε λ β + + ΔΖ + = ΔΥ 1                                                                              (19) 
 
Turning to the results, our findings in Tables 4B and 5B remain similar to those 
depicted in Tables 1-3. At the same time, one minor difference in results is that the 
coefficient of elect_end in Table 5B, in comparison with results in Table 2, turns out to be 
significantly and positively related with variable current_exp.  
 
Table 4B and 5B here 
 
3.4.3. Testing for outliers 
As a next step, in order to further increase the precision of our results and ensure that 
extreme values do not drive them, we use the Hadi (1992) method that identifies multiple 
outliers in multivariate data. This method measures the distance of data points from the 
main body of data and then iteratively reduces the sample to exclude distant data points.
11 
Hadi’s (1992) approach identifies 6, 10 and 13 outlier observations for fiscal 
variables capital, capital_exp and current_exp, respectively.  At Tables 4C and 5C we re-
estimate our regressions after dropping the identified outlier observations. As can be 
seen, results regarding all electoral indicators remain unaffected in comparison with 
results depicted in Tables 1-3.  
 





                                                 
11 We set the significance level for outlier cutoff at p = 0.1.   23
3.4.4. Some additional checks 
We also conduct some additional checks to ensure that our findings are not product of 
particular samples or specifications. First,  as mentioned above, we excluded Greece, 
Portugal and Spain from the sample, since we have doubts about the persistence of the 
“new democracy” effect. Alternatively, however, following Brender and Drazen (2005), 
we re-estimate equation (18) including all developed countries in the sample, but we 
exclude the first four competitive elections that took place in Greece, Portugal and Spain. 
The qualitative results derived are similar to the initial sample of established 
democracies. 
Second, as outlined by Persson and Tabellini (2003), pre-electoral manipulation in 
fiscal policy may depend significantly on the nature of the political system. More 
specifically, electoral cycles may differ between proportional and majoritarian systems or 
presidential and parliamentary governments. Regarding the first classification, 14 
countries in our sample use proportional voting rules while 5 countries use majoritarian 
rules. Our results, suggest that our findings for the sample of 19 “old” democracies are 
very much alike with those depicted for countries that use proportional rules. This result 
seems to verify the notion that the fall in government investment is indeed a more 
expected result in a proportional system. Politicians in this system are more prone to cut 
geographically targeted public spending such as investment rather than transfers which 
are easier to target across social groups [see Milesi-Ferreti et al. (2002), Persson and 
Tabellini (2000)]. Concerning the second part of constitutional rules, we have only two 
presidential democracies, Switzerland and the U.S.A.. It should be noted that qualitative 
results remain unaffected after dropping Switzerland and the U.S.A. from our sample. 
Finally, one last check is to exclude from sample years 1993 to 1999, in order to 
investigate whether the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) agreement had any effect on the 
adoption of fiscal policy by the members of the European Union and consequently on our 
results.
12 Apart from some negligible changes, all results remain unaffected.
13 
 
                                                 
12 The SGP agreement is based on articles 99 and 104 of the European Community Treaty that adopted at 1993 in 
Maastricht. The actual criteria that member states must respect are:  (i) an annual budget deficit no higher than 3% of 
GDP, (ii) a natioanl debt lower than 60% of GDP or approaching that value.  
13 Results for these modifications are available upon request.    24
4. Conclusions 
Electoral incentives can affect both the level and the composition of fiscal policy.  Office 
motivated incumbent policymakers may shift public expenditure towards more visible 
current expenditure and away from less visible capital expenditure in order to improve 
the voters’ perception of their ability thereby increasing the probability of being re-
elected. This paper presented empirical results for a sample of 19 developed, established 
democracies over the period 1972-1999 that support this theoretical prediction. Indeed we 
find robust evidence that indicate that elections decrease capital and increase current 
expenditures as a percentage of total expenditures.  
Regarding aggregate fiscal variables, in line with Brender and Drazen (2005) and Shi 
and Svensson (2006) we find no evidence for an electoral cycle for government deficit 
and expenditures but we do find a negative effect of election on revenue. Going a step 
further, we look at the electoral impact on the composition of fiscal revenue and find that 
the fall in revenue in election periods is attributed to a fall in direct taxation. This implies 
that policymakers prefer to cut the part of taxation that is more visible to voters since it 
has a direct impact on their disposable income. Moreover, a cut in direct taxation is likely 
to have a positive impact on growth by affecting individuals’ savings and labour supply 
decisions. Finally, attempting to distinguish between pre-determined and endogenous 
elections reveals that – in line with the assumptions of the theoretical model- both the 
revenue cycle and the shift in the composition of public expenditure occur when elections 
are exogenous.  
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Appendix. Data sources and descriptive statistics  
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methodology, data taken from Global Development 
















Own calculations based on Kneller’s et al. (1999) 
methodology, data taken from Global Development 





















Taxation on domestic goods and services as a share of 












Own calculations, data taken Global Development 












































Difference between the natural log of real GDP in the 
country and its country-specific trend (obtained, using 

















Population between 15 and 64 years old as a share of 





























World Bank Development indicators 
            29





Dummy variable that receives the value 1 in the 












Armingeon, K., et. al. (2008). Comparative Political 




Dummy variable that receives the value 1 when 













Armingeon, K., et. al. (2008). Comparative Political 




Dummy variable that receives the value 1 when 













Armingeon, K., et. al. (2008). Comparative Political 




Indicator variable that receives value (x/12) in the 
election year, with x the months before election, when 
elections held in the predetermined date and 0 












Own calculations, data taken from Armingeon, K., 




Indicator variable that receives value (1- 
electt_pred_2) in the election year, with x the months 
before election, when elections held in the 












Own calculations, data taken from Armingeon, K., 




Indicator variable that receives value (x/12) in the 
election year, with x the months before election, when 
elections not held in the predetermined date and 0 












Own calculations, data taken from Armingeon, K., 




Indicator variable that receives value (1- 
electt_end_2) in the election year, with x the months 
before election, when elections not held in the 













Own calculations, data taken from Armingeon, K., 
et. al. (2008). Comparative Political Data Set I   30
“Table 1. Elections and fiscal policy: basic findings” 
  Fiscal variables scaled to GDP  Spending variables scaled to 
total expenditures 
Tax variables scaled to 
total revenues 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
Method  FE FE FE  FE  FE  FE  FE  FE FE  FE FE 
Dependent 
variable  balance expenditures  revenues  capital  current  direct  indirect capital_exp  current_exp  direct_rev  indirect_rev 
elec  -0.183 0.005  -0.267**  -0.077**  0.097  -0.270*** -0.021  -0.227**  0.212**  -0.327*  0.173 
  (-1.08) (0.03) (-2.21)  (-1.97)  (0.78)  (-2.69)  (-0.43)  (-2.32) (2.07) (-1.73) (1.13) 
                 
Yt-1  0.719*** 0.832*** 0.805***  0.748***  0.848***  0.780***  0.775***  0.760*** 0.754*** 0.808*** 0.788*** 
  (12.44) (29.66) (23.20)  (18.31)  (32.07)  (19.48)  (18.17)  (22.17) (21.98) (17.32) (20.07) 
                 
lgdppc  3.958 -1.390 0.854  -0.187  -1.309  0.374  0.170 0.170 -0.252  -0.271  -0.834 
  (1.38) (-0.96) (0.66)  (-0.47)  (-1.00)  (0.36)  (0.38) (0.16) (-0.23)  (-0.15)  (-0.62) 
                 
growth  0.093 -0.334***  -0.170***  -0.018  -0.316***  -0.130*** -0.018  0.035  -0.034  -0.079*  0.108** 
  (1.38) (-7.91) (-4.07)  (-1.64)  (-8.08)  (-4.56)  (-1.14)  (1.22) (-1.09)  (-1.70) (2.29) 
                 
 R
2  0.642 0.897 0.830  0.689  0.924  0.790  0.747  0.789 0.793 0.696 0.695 
N  469 474 474  464  464  473  481  464 464 473 473 
Avg. time series 
length 
24.7 24.9 24.9  24.4  24.4  24.9  25.3  24.4 24.4 24.9 24.9 
Specification tests                     
N1  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N2  0.000 0.002 0.112  0.141  0.000  0.343  0.000  0.100 0.097 0.028 0.558 
Notes:  t-statistics, calculated using White’s heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, are reported in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 1% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level and * denotes significance at 10% level. All regressions 
include country and time intercepts. 
N1 = Likelihood ratio test for groupwise heteroskedasticity 
N2= F-test time   
P-values are reported for the respective tests   31
“Table 2. Predetermined vs. Endogenous elections” 
  Fiscal variables scaled to GDP  Spending variables scaled to 
total expenditures 
Tax variables scaled to total 
revenues 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) (9)  (10)  (11) 
Method  FE FE FE  FE  FE  FE  FE  FE FE  FE FE 
Dependent 
variable  balance expenditures  revenues  capital  current  direct  indirect capital_exp  current_exp  direct_rev  indirect_rev 
elec_pred  -0.027 -0.153  -0.345**  -0.112**  -0.024  -0.346*** -0.010  -0.288**  0.247**  -0.388*  0.264 
  (-0.12) (-1.06) (-2.58)  (-2.38)  (-0.19)  (-2.94)  (-0.17)  (-2.48)  (1.98) (-1.80) (1.44) 
                
elec_end  -0.426* 0.248  -0.146  -0.021  0.292  -0.153  -0.039 -0.129  0.157 -0.232 0.032 
  (-1.96) (1.01) (-0.79)  (-0.36)  (1.31)  (-1.07)  (-0.53)  (-0.92) (1.12) (-0.75) (0.13) 
                
Yt-1  0.719*** 0.831*** 0.804***  0.746***  0.847***  0.779***  0.774***  0.759*** 0.753*** 0.807*** 0.786*** 
  (12.36) (29.90) (23.21)  (18.53)  (32.13)  (19.50)  (18.12)  (22.09) (21.84) (17.29) (19.86) 
                
lgdppc  3.911 -1.375 0.868  -0.174  -1.263  0.387  0.168 0.200 -0.270  -0.258  -0.851 
  (1.35) (-0.95) (0.67)  (-0.43)  (-0.96)  (0.37)  (0.37) (0.19) (-0.25)  (-0.14)  (-0.63) 
                
growth  0.093 -0.335***  -0.171***  -0.018*  -0.316***  -0.130*** -0.018  0.034  -0.034  -0.079*  0.108** 
  (1.39)  (-7.96)  (-4.10) (-1.66) (-8.13) (-4.59) (-1.13)  (1.21)  (-1.08)  (-1.71)  (2.30) 
                
R
2  0.643 0.897 0.830  0.690  0.925  0.791  0.747  0.789 0.793 0.706 0.693 
N  469 474 474  464  464  473  464  464 464 473 473 
Avg. time series 
length 
24.7 24.9 24.9  24.4  24.4  24.9  25.3  24.4 24.4 24.9 24.9 
Specification tests                     
N1  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N2  0.000 0.001 0.133  0.124  0.000  0.366  0.000  0.096 0.098 0.029 0.580 
Notes:  see Table 1.   32
“Table 3. Alternative timing of elections and Predetermined vs. Endogenous elections” 
  Fiscal variables scaled to GDP  Spending variables scaled 
to total expenditures 
Tax variables scaled to total 
revenues 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
Method  FE  FE  FE  FE FE  FE  FE FE FE  FE FE 
Dependent 
variable  balance expenditures  revenues  capital  current  direct  indirect  capital_exp  current_exp  direct_rev indirect_rev 
elect_pred_2  -0.015 -0.244 -0.424**  -0.186***  -0.062  -0.405** 0.024 -0.508***  0.362* -0.358  0.310 
  (-0.04) (-1.05)  (-2.03)  (-2.73)  (-0.31) (-2.09) (0.27) (-2.86) (1.89) (-1.03) (1.12) 
                      
elect-1 _pred_2  -0.258 -0.189  -0.193  -0.064  -0.075 0.105 -0.045 -0.298 0.259 0.571 -0.193 
  (-0.68) (-0.63)  (-0.71)  (-0.66)  (-0.27) (0.47) (-0.31) (-1.12) (0.93) (1.24)  (-0.42) 
                      
elect_end_2  -0.790*** 0.660*  0.004  0.012  0.670**  0.024  -0.057 -0.139 0.149 0.017 -0.218 
  (-2.64) (1.94)  (0.02)  (0.17)  (2.22) (0.12) (-0.61) (-0.77) (0.82) (0.04)  (-0.73) 
                      
elect-1_end_2  0.156 0.446  0.611*  0.134  0.196  0.527*  -0.204 0.221 -0.398  0.426  -1.435*** 
  (0.31) (1.14)  (1.85)  (0.81)  (0.60) (1.79)  (-1.36) (0.48) (-0.94)  (0.69) (-3.35) 
                      
Yt-1  0.719*** 0.829***  0.804***  0.746***  0.846*** 0.778*** 0.773*** 0.760*** 0.754***  0.805*** 0.783*** 
  (12.41) (30.14)  (23.10)  (18.50) (32.29)  (19.40) (18.07) (22.23) (22.01)  (17.17) (20.14) 
                      
lgdppc  3.978 -1.476  0.845  -0.177 -1.330 0.333 0.170 0.209 -0.290  -0.343 -0.791 
  (1.38) (-1.02)  (0.65)  (-0.44) (-1.01) (0.32) (0.37) (0.20) (-0.27)  (-0.18) (-0.59) 
                      
growth  0.094 -0.333***  -0.169***  -0.017 -0.316***  -0.130*** -0.019  0.036  -0.035  -0.080*  0.107** 
  (1.39) (-7.97)  (-4.02)  (-1.60) (-8.14) (-4.51)  (-1.14) (1.25) (-1.10)  (-1.71) (2.26) 
                      
R
2  0.668 0.898  0.831  0.691  0.925 0.790 0.749 0.790 0.794 0.696  0.703 
N  469  474  474  464 464  473 481 464 464  473 473 
Avg. time series 
length 
24.7 24.9  24.9  24.4  24.4 24.9 25.3 24.4 24.4  24.9 24.9 
Specification tests                     
N1  0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 
N2  0.000 0.002  0.105  0.155  0.000 0.321 0.000 0.136 0.151 0.028  0.492 
Notes: see Table 1.   33
“Table 4A. Robustness: Alternative control variables” 
  Fiscal variables scaled to GDP  Spending variables scaled to total 
expenditures 
Tax variables scaled to total 
revenues 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11) 
Method  FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE 
Dependent 
variable  balance expenditures  revenues  capital  current  direct  indirect capital_exp  current_exp  direct_rev  indirect_rev 
elec  -0.198 -0.006  -0.289**  -0.078**  0.083  -0.291*** -0.025  -0.224** 0.205** -0.334*  0.180 
  (-1.20) (-0.04) (-2.48) (-1.99) (0.60) (-2.90) (-0.52) (-2.29) (1.99) (-1.75) (1.17) 
             
Yt-1  0.682*** 0.836*** 0.789*** 0.744*** 0.854*** 0.773*** 0.782*** 0.753*** 0.744*** 0.798*** 0.787*** 
  (12.00) (25.93) (22.00) (17.76) (27.96) (19.35) (18.21) (21.46) (20.96) (16.41) (19.53) 
             
lgdppc  2.705 -2.154 -1.634 -0.319 -2.036 -1.848 0.000 0.105 -0.200 -2.611 0.494 
  (1.02) (-1.11) (-1.14) (-0.75) (-1.14) (-1.60) (0.00) (0.09) (-0.17) (-1.29) (0.34) 
             
gdphp  0.137 -0.062  0.115***  -0.000 -0.066  0.084***  0.017 0.008 -0.008 0.067 -0.044 
  (2.21) (-1.35) (3.26) (-0.00) (-1.56) (3.08) (1.11) (0.27) (-0.28) (1.23) (-0.94) 
             
pop65+  0.525*** -0.076  0.330** -0.027  -0.092  0.183* 0.008 -0.075 0.143 -0.174  -0.216* 
  (3.68) (-0.58) (2.47) (-0.62) (-0.71) (1.68) (0.21) (-0.65) (1.44) (-0.95) (-1.66) 
             
pop1564  0.311***  -0.113 0.108 -0.004  -0.109  0.149**  0.000 0.001 0.057 0.102 -0.002 
  (2.67) (-1.19) (1.22) (-0.14)  (-1.21) (2.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.74) (0.86) (-0.02) 
             
trade  0.032* -0.069***  -0.038*** -0.004 -0.063***  -0.021**  -0.011**  0.011 -0.013 0.007 0.002 
  (1.88)  (-4.72) (-3.60) (-0.80) (-5.19) (-2.46) (-2.40) (0.87) (-1.04) (0.47)  (0.15) 
              
R
2  0.657 0.875 0.839 0.664 0.905 0.776 0.735 0.773 0.779 0.697 0.693 
N  469 474 474 464 464 473 481 464 464 473 473 
Avg. time 
series length 
24.7 24.9 24.9 24.4 24.4 24.9 25.3 24.4 24.4 24.9 24.9 
Specification  tests            
N1  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N2  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.128 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.271 0.438 0.153 0.680 
Notes: see Table 1.   34
“Table 4B. Robustness: regression in First differences” 
  Fiscal variables scaled to GDP  Spending variables scaled to 
total expenditures 
Tax variables scaled to total 
revenues 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
Method  FD FD FD  FD  FD FD  FD  FD  FD FD FD 
Dependent 
variable 
fd_balance fd_expenditures fd_revenues fd_capital  fd_current  fd_direct  fd_indirect fd_capital_exp fd_current_exp fd_direct_rev fd_indirect_rev 
elec  -0.186 0.001  -0.286**  -0.102**  0.107  -0.297*** -0.018  -0.274***  0.270**  -0.348*  0.203 
  (-1.09) (0.01) (-2.40)  (-2.54)  (0.87) (-2.85)  (-0.37)  (-2.63)  (2.46) (-1.84) (1.24) 
                  
fd_lgdppc  23.549*** -26.870***  -0.883  -1.460  -26.684***  -0.072  1.013  1.277  -1.873  1.605  2.555 
  (2.60) (-5.34) (-0.21)  (    -1.12)  (-6.11)  (-0.02)  (0.60)  (0.38)  (-0.48) (0.26)  (0.47) 
                      
fd_growth  -0.134* -0.050  -0.126***  -0.006  -0.036  -0.106***  -0.031**  0.009  0.001 -0.121** 0.047 
  (-1.86) (-1.22) (-3.78)  (-0.61)  (-1.03) (-4.09)  (-2.24)  (0.34)  (0.02)  (-2.42)  (1.07) 
                      
R
2  0.237 0.428 0.148  0.101  0.477  0.130  0.097  0.074 0.060 0.087 0.064 
N  469 474 474  464  464 473  481  464  464 473 473 
Avg. time series 
length 
24.7 24.9 24.9  24.4  24.4 24.9  25.3  24.4  24.4 24.9 24.9 
Specification  tests                 
N1  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N2  0.000 0.000 0.013  0.149  0.000  0.254  0.000  0.104 0.273 0.216 0.499 
Notes: Notes:  t-statistics, calculated using White’s heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, are reported in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 1% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level and * denotes significance at 10% level. All 
regressions include time intercepts. 
N1 = Likelihood ratio test for groupwise heteroskedasticity 
N2= F-test time   
P-values are reported for the respective tests  35




scaled to GDP 
Spending variables scaled to total 
expenditures 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Method  FE FE  FE 
Dependent 
 variable  capital capital_exp  current_exp 
elec  -0.063* -0.180**  0.175* 
  (-1.75) (-1.97)  (1.80) 
      
Yt-1  0.695*** 0.725***  0.713*** 
  (17.94) (20.55)  (19.31) 
      
lgdppc  0.445 1.372 -1.590* 
  (1.47) (1.60)  (-1.67) 
      
growth  -0.023** 0.013  -0.012 
  (-2.28) (0.49)  (-0.40) 
      
 R
2  0.680 0.784  0.778 
N  458 454  451 
Avg. time series length  24.1 23.9  23.7 
Specification tests      
N1  0.000 0.000  0.000 
N2  0.038 0.063  0.040 
Notes:  t-statistics, calculated using White’s heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, are reported in parentheses. Regressions 
are estimated after using Hadi (1994) method to identify and eliminate outlier observations.  *** denotes significance at 1% 
level, ** denotes significance at 5% level and * denotes significance at 10% level. All regressions include country and time 
intercepts. 
N1 = Likelihood ratio test for groupwise heteroskedasticity 
N2= F-test time   
P-values are reported for the respective tests   36
“Table 5A. Robustness: Alternative control variables” 
  Fiscal variables scaled to GDP  Spending variables scaled 
to total expenditures 
Tax variables scaled to 
total revenues 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
Method  FE FE FE  FE  FE  FE  FE  FE FE  FE FE 
Dependent  
variable  balance expenditures revenues  capital  current  direct  indirect capital_exp  current_exp  direct_rev  indirect_rev 
                   
elec_pred  -0.069 -0.114  -0.345***  -0.110**  0.013  -0.358*** -0.007  -0.291**  0.244*  -0.406*  0.267 
  (-0.32) (-0.70) (-2.67)  (-2.32)  (0.09)  (-3.08)  (-0.12) (-2.48)  (1.93) (-1.88) (1.45) 
                 
elec_end  -0.400* 0.160  -0.203  -0.027  0.1  96  -0.188  -0.053 -0.115  0.142 -0.224 0.045 
  (-1.77) (0.61) (-1.11)  (-0.47)  (0.83)  (-1.24)  (-0.72)  (-0.82) (1.01)  (-0.70) (0.18) 
                   
elect_pred_2  -0.076 -0.178  -0.405**  -0.183***  -0.002  -0.420** 0.033 -0.519*** 0.368*  -0.414  0.318 
  (-0.23) (-0.69) (-1.99)  (-2.66)  (-0.01)  (-2.17)  (0.38) (-2.88)  (1.87) (-1.17) (1.15) 
                 
elect-1 _pred_2  -0.290 -0.308 -0.348  -0.069  -0.183  -0.004 -0.073  -0.274  0.223  0.548  -0.126 
  (-0.79) (-1.07) (-1.33)  (-0.73)  (-0.66)  (-0.02)  (-0.51) (-1.03)  (0.81) (1.15) (-0.28) 
                 
elect_end_2  -0.727** 0.593*  -0.000  0.006 0.595* 0.016  -0.069  -0.136  0.154  0.005  -0.234 
  (-2.39) (1.68) (-0.00)  (0.08)  (1.86)  (0.08)  (-0.77)  (-0.73) (0.82) (0.01) (-0.77) 
                 
elect-1_end_2  0.090 0.445 0.539*  0.135  0.184  0.508  -0.261*  0.228 -0.396  0.474  -1.410*** 
  (0.18) (1.13) (1.66)  (0.82)  (0.55)  (1.59)  (-1.87)  (0.50) (-0.96)  (0.75)  (-3.11) 
                   
Notes: see Table 1.   37
“Table 5B. Robustness: regression in First differences ” 
  Fiscal variables scaled to GDP  Spending variables scaled 
to total expenditures 
Tax variables scaled to 
total revenues 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) (9)  (10)  (11) 
Method  FD FD FD  FD  FD  FD  FD  FD FD  FD  FD 
Dependent 
 variable  balance expenditures revenues  capital  current  direct  indirect capital_exp  current_exp  direct_rev  indirect_rev 
                    
elec_pred  -0.069 -0.139  -0.371***  -0.122**  0.007  -0.381*** -0.033  -0.303**  0.266**  -0.421**  0.229 
  (-0.32) (-0.98) (-2.78)  (-2.49)  (0.06)  (-3.20)  (-0.61)  (-2.45)  (1.99) (-2.02) (1.29) 
                      
elec_end  -0.359* 0.207  -0.161  -0.071  0.258  -0.173  0.004 -0.230 0.277**  -0.240 0.164 
  (-1.69) (0.91)  (-0.90)  (-1.30)  (1.22)  (-1.15)  (0.05) (-1.62)  (2.01) (-0.79) (0.64) 
                   
elect_pred_2  -0.022 -0.262  -0.449**  -0.196***  -0.061  -0.424** -0.030 -0.535***  0.385*  -0.338  0.173 
  (-0.07) (-1.14) (-2.08)  (-2.65)  (-0.32)  (-2.20)  (-0.36)  (-2.75)  (1.78) (-1.03) (0.67) 
                 
elect-1 _pred_2  -0.426 -0.129 -0.237  -0.076  0.014 0.056  -0.058  -0.316  0.294 0.496 -0.141 
  (-1.10) (-0.39) (-0.86)  (-0.73)  (0.05) (0.24)  (-0.43)  (-1.08)  (0.98) (1.03) (-0.32) 
                 
elect_end_2  -0.653** 0.532*  -0.078 -0.063  0.584**  -0.055  -0.004  -0.300 0.340*  -0.054 0.001 
  (-2.14) (1.67) (-0.32)  (-0.88)  (2.02)  (-0.30)  (-0.04)  (-1.58) (1.79) (-0.12) (0.00) 
                 
elect-1_end_2  0.421  0.307  0.573*  0.070 0.071 0.486  -0.157 0.177  -0.386 0.297  -1.168*** 
  (0.90)  (0.80)  (1.70) (0.41) (0.22) (1.60)  (-1.10) (0.37)  (-0.95) (0.48) (-2.82) 
                 
Notes:  see Table 4B.   38
“Table 5C. Robustness: Testing for outliers” 
  Fiscal variables 
scaled to GDP 
Spending variables scaled to total expenditures 
 (2)  (4)  (4) 
Method  FE FE  FE 
Dependent 
 variable  capital capital_exp current_exp 
      
elec_pred  -0.089** -0.238**  0.210* 
  (-2.08) (-2.21)  (1.79) 
      
elec_end  -0.022 -0.082  0.117 
  (-0.39) (-0.59)  (0.83) 
      
elect_pred_2  -0.156** -0.458***  0.353* 
  (-2.53) (-2.72)  (1.92) 
      
elect-1 _pred_2  -0.053 -0.284  0.248 
  (-0.56) (-1.13)  (0.95) 
      
elect_end_2  0.008 -0.117  0.126 
  (0.12) (-0.67)  (0.70) 
      
elect-1_end_2  0.047 -0.195  0.001 
  (0.37) (-0.56)  (0.00) 
      
Notes:  see Table 4C. 
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